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This article analyzes the similarities and distinctions between ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’
and genocide in the context of both Bosnia’s and Croatia’s genocide claims against
Serbia brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It examines the
institutional role of the ICJ and the criticisms on how the Court handled Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro. The legal definition and elements of
genocide as contained in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) are discussed, with a particular emphasis on the
required intent to ‘‘destroy’’ a protected group. The article reviews case law from
other international tribunals and argues that evidence of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ may
demonstrate the intent to ‘‘destroy’’ a protected group and support a finding of
genocide.
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On 18 November 2008, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that it had
jurisdiction to examine Croatia’s allegation that Serbia committed genocide during
the 1991–1995 Croatian War.1 The country was seeking compensation for what it
described as ‘‘a form of genocide which resulted in large numbers of Croatian citizens
being displaced, killed, tortured, or illegally detained as well as extensive property
destruction.’’2 This development carries important implications both for the adjudica-
tion of genocide and the role of the ICJ. Notably, it marks only the second time in
the ICJ’s sixty-five-year history that the Court has agreed to review a claim arising
from the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (UNCG).3
Just a year and half earlier, the ICJ had decided similar claims in Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro. (The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became
known as Serbia and Montenegro after 2001 and as Serbia following Montenegro’s
succession in 2006.) On 26 February 2007, the ICJ found that Serbia did not commit
genocide during the Bosnian War from 1992 to 1995. However, the Court did find
that Serbia violated its obligations under the UNCG by failing to prevent genocide
in the Bosnian community of Srebrenica in 1995. The Court further ruled that
Serbia was liable for not fully cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), including the failure to bring Ratko Mladic (Chief
of Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska) to the tribunal for trial. Furthermore,
the Court held that Serbia should take steps to punish those responsible for the
genocide but that it did not have to pay reparations.4 Consequently, this heralded
the first time a nation-state was in any way deemed responsible for violating the
UNCG.
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This landmark ruling established that a nation-state, as opposed to individuals,
could be held accountable for genocide under the Convention. The opinion also inno-
vatively confirmed that nation-states must deploy ‘‘all means reasonably available
to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible . . .’’5 Despite the import of
this holding, the decision is limited by the finding that genocide only occurred in
Srebrenica and that Serbia was not an active participant. Moreover, the Court has
been roundly criticized for its reliance on the corresponding work of the ICTY, the
standard of proof employed, and the methodology used to examine evidence.6 These
factors could influence how similar claims, such as Croatia’s, are handled. They also
expose the Court’s institutional limitations, prompting some to question whether the
ICJ is even an appropriate forum to contest genocide claims.7
These deficiencies most likely contributed to the Court’s limited conclusions,
despite widespread evidence of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ coupled with murder and other
abuses. Further, the opinion raises questions over how evidence of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’
should fit into the broader legal framework when evaluating claims of genocide. As
we will see, genocide and ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ are distinct concepts that share similar
features. Specifically, how do the motivations behind ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ elucidate
contentions over the genocidal intent to ‘‘destroy’’ a particular group? As the Court
assays Croatia’s allegations, it is worth reviewing the institutional role of the ICJ,
the characteristics of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ and genocide, and the issues presented by
both Bosnia and Croatia.
The World Court
Situated at the Peace Palace in The Hague, the ICJ, also commonly referred to as
the World Court, is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.8 The Court
seats fifteen judges, who are nominated by nations and approved by the Security
Council and General Assembly for nine-year terms and who are distributed by re-
gion.9 Like its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, the ICJ
has a dual mandate: to decide contentious cases and render advisory opinions.
Contentious cases involve disputes between nations and the Court’s judgement is
considered binding. Only nations may be parties to contentious cases.10 Advisory
opinions comprise legal questions submitted by other United Nations’ organs, includ-
ing the General Assembly.11 While technically non-binding, advisory opinions are
regarded as authoritative. The ICJ may also issue provisional orders prior to a final
decision to preserve the rights of a party.12
In contentious matters, the Court has jurisdiction13 in three instances: (1) by
‘‘special agreement’’ where parties to a dispute agree to submit their case to the
court;14 (2) cases authorized by treaty establishing that future disputes emanating
from the treaty will be adjudicated by the ICJ;15 and (3) cases between nations that
have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.16 Accordingly, jurisdiction is
either consensual or compulsory based on prior agreement. Article 9 of the UNCG
gives the ICJ jurisdiction over state disputes arising from the UNCG. The issue of
jurisdiction over Bosnia’s claims was complicated by questions involving state succes-
sion and the status of Serbia’s membership in the UN following the dissolution of
Yugoslavia. It was ultimately determined that the Court did have jurisdiction under
the UNCG, which Yugoslavia ratified in 1950.17
If a nation refuses to comply with a final Court decision, the only recourse is for
the prevailing party to petition the Security Council for ‘‘assistance’’ in obtaining
compliance.18 Various studies suggest that, despite lack of a strong enforcement
mechanism, compliance with ICJ rulings is relatively favorable. A 1987 study con-
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cluded that compliance with final ICJ decisions was approximately 80%.19 An updated
analysis found a 60% compliance rate from 1987–2004.20 The apparent decline most
likely reflects a stricter standard used to measure and define ‘‘compliance.’’21
In an exhaustive study, Compliance with Decisions of the International Court of
Justice, Constanze Schulte also concludes that overall compliance with final judge-
ments is often realized.22 However, the author notes that compliance can be difficult
to achieve when the dispute arises from a highly charged political situation.23 Fur-
ther, Schulte emphasizes the lack of compliance with provisional orders. This largely
results from interim measures being ‘‘almost exclusively’’ requested in judicial pro-
ceedings launched unilaterally by a party when the Court’s jurisdiction is in ques-
tion.24 These compliance factors raise concerns specific to genocide cases, particularly
in the context of ongoing armed conflict rooted in long-standing civil strife.
Prior to the 1990s, the Court had little experience with issues pertaining to
human rights, let alone genocide and armed conflict. The ICJ has traditionally been
regarded as a consent-based arbitrator of disputes between nation-states. During
the Cold War (1947–1989), most contentious suits dealt with land, maritime, or fish-
ing boundary disputes.25 There were four that concerned self-determination in the
context of decolonization,26 while several other disputes did feature human rights
issues such as apartheid,27 political asylum,28 unlawful detention of diplomats,29
and prisoners of war.30 Only two cases, both arising from the Contra war in
Nicaragua, involved ongoing armed conflict.31 Likewise, most of the Court’s advisory
opinions related to internal issues of the UN and other international bodies or
nations.32 Four addressed the collective right of self-determination,33 and only two
others, adjudging reservations to the genocide treaty and the right of UN human
rights rapporteurs to travel,34 touched on human rights.
The period following the Cold War has been characterized, in part, by factually
complex cases that encompassed highly charged political disputes, frequently in the
context of human rights and armed conflict. Examples include the 1996 advisory
opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons35 and the controversial 2004 advisory
opinion on the construction of Israel’s wall in the Occupied Territory.36 The Court
has entertained disputes involving the right to consular assistance in death penalty
cases.37 Additionally, Serbia sued members of NATO after the military intervention
in Kosovo,38 and Congo sued the Rwandese Republic for violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law.39 (In the NATO and Congo cases, the Court
found it lacked jurisdiction.) In addition to Croatia’s current genocide claims, the
ICJ has agreed to provide an advisory opinion on the status of Kosovo’s indepen-
dence.40 These chapters of the Court’s post–Cold War era began on 20 March 1993
when Bosnia and Herzegovina sued Yugoslavia for alleged genocide, which was
docketed during the still early stages of the conflict.41
‘‘A Problem from Hell’’
The dissolution of Yugoslavia officially began in June 1991, when Croatia and Slovenia
declared independence.42 Likewise, a proclamation of Bosnia and Herzegovina sover-
eignty in October 1991 was followed by a referendum for independence in March
1992, which was supported by the Muslim and Croatian population. The Bosnian
Serbs (31% of the population) opposed succession and announced their own inde-
pendent state of Republika Srpska.43 War immediately broke out between the two
entities and was divided along ethnic lines.44 Efforts by the international community
to broker a cease fire were futile.45 Instances of organized massacres, rape, torture,
and other serious abuses were reported.46 A study undertaken by the UN’s Commis-
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sion of Experts concluded that ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ was being perpetrated, defining
this term as ‘‘rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimida-
tion to remove persons of given groups from the area.’’47
The first report of the Special Rapporteur, published under the auspices of the
UN Commission on Human Rights, underscored the various methods used in ‘‘ethnic
cleansing,’’ including
[r]eplacement by extremists of those elected representatives who refused to cooperate
with ethnic cleansing, harassment, discrimination, beatings, torture, summary execu-
tions, expulsions, forced crossing of the confrontation line, confiscation of property,
dismissal from work, intimidation, destruction of mosques, use of the siege and cut-
ting off supplies of food and other essentials to civilian population centres. The report
[of the Special Rapporteur] drew on the experience of the city and region of Bihac as
well as Bosanska Dubica, Celinac, Sanski Most and Sarajevo.48
The Special Rapporteur’s second report documented ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ in and
around Bosanski Novi, Prijedor, Doboj, Kotor Varos, Trabnik, and Trnopolje.49
The Special Rapporteur subsequently reported on
[a]ccounts and testimonies which are characteristic of the information which is
increasingly becoming available from refugees regarding the systemic nature of ethnic
cleansing as well as the human rights and humanitarian law violations. They show
the methods by which violent change in the demographic map of Bosnia and Herze-
govina has been achieved, leaving 810,000 people displaced internally and 700,000
refugees in other countries . . . not only Croats and Muslims are the victims of ethnic
cleansing; Serbs who refuse to cooperate with this policy have also been victimized.
There are reports of the arbitrary execution of such Serbs, for example in Teslic on 2
June 1992 when three Serbs were reportedly killed for refusing to cooperate with the
Yugoslav national Peoples’ Army (JNA) and Serbian Democratic Party militia in per-
secuting Muslims and Croats.50
It was further emphasized that ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ was being perpetrated through the
widespread use of rape:
Rape is an abuse of power and control in which the rapist seeks to humiliate, shame,
degrade and terrify the victim. In all his reports, the Special Rapporteur has empha-
sized the variety of methods used to achieve ethnic cleansing. Rape is one of those
methods, as has been stated from the outset. In this context, rape has been used not
only as an attack on the individual victim, but is used to humiliate, shame, degrade
and terrify the entire ethnic group. There are reliable reports of public rapes, for exam-
ple, in front of a whole village, designed to terrorize the population and force ethnic
groups to flee.51
Bosnia alleged that, pursuant to state policy, Serb forces encircled civilians to cut off
supplies and starve the population. Additionally, Serb forces committed ‘‘cultural
genocide’’ by destroying historical, religious, and cultural property.52 By the end of
1995, approximately 2.7 million refugees had been displaced in Bosnia and Herze-
govina.53 International organizations estimate that more than 100,000 people died
from the conflict between 1992 and 1995, and two-thirds were Bosnian Muslims.54
One particularly horrific incident was the massacre of Bosnian Muslims at
Srebrenica in July 1995, when Serb forces overtook 370 lightly armed Dutch peace-
keepers and killed almost 8,000 men and boys. The UN had declared this area a safe
haven and had pledged to protect it.55 Following a Serbian motor attack on the city
market in Sarajevo in August 1995, NATO forces initiated air strikes against various
Serbian military targets.56 The NATO campaign resulted in negotiations that culmi-
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nated in the Dayton Accords, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, officially ending
the war.57
During the Court’s early proceedings, two provisional orders were issued, both in
1993, demanding that Serbia and Montenegro ‘‘immediately . . . take all measures
within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide.’’58 These interim
injunctions had little influence, as evidenced by Srebrenica. Meanwhile, concurrent
with Bosnia’s petition to the ICJ, the UN passed a resolution in May 1993 that
created the ICTY to prosecute claims of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia.59 The ICTY’s work is expected to
conclude in 2013.60
The two international courts had parallel, but distinct roles. The ICJ was limited
to determining the state’s (Serbia’s) responsibility for alleged genocide.61 It did not
have jurisdiction over related but separate allegations of war crimes and crimes
against humanity; nor did the Court have jurisdiction over individuals.62 As noted,
the ICJ only considers disputes between nation-states, and jurisdiction under the
UNCG does not incorporate other humanitarian crimes. In contrast, the ICTY was
charged with examining the alleged conduct of individuals, such as Serbian Presi-
dent Slobodan Milosevic, in committing any war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide.63
Prior to the Bosnia case, genocide had not been substantially defined beyond the
contours of the UNCG, and no international tribunal had ever previously considered
such claims under the UNCG.64 The Nuremberg Trials, while influential, commenced
prior to the UNCG and dealt primarily with charges of war crimes and crimes
against humanity.65 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was subse-
quently created in 1994, and the Rome Statute establishing the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC) was not effectuated until 2002, following the ratification by sixty
countries.66 Consequently, there was little precedential guidance available for the
ICJ on how to proceed.
The Meaning of a Crime
Responding to the atrocities of the Holocaust, the UN General Assembly passed a
resolution in 1946 defining genocide as ‘‘a denial of the right of existence of entire
human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human
beings.’’67 Two years later the UNCG was adopted and established genocide as
a crime in violation of international law. Article 2 of the convention’s definition
contains three primary elements: (1) prohibited acts that qualify as genocide (i.e.,
killing; causing serious bodily or mental harm; inflicting conditions of life calculated
to physically destroy; measures imposed to prevent births; forcibly transferring chil-
dren); (2) protected groups that must be targeted; and (3) the mens rea special intent
to ‘‘destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group . . .’’68 It
wasn’t until the 1990s that this document became the subject of substantial judicial
interpretation defining these elements, particularly that of genocidal intent.
The word ‘‘genocide,’’ the crime of crimes, was first coined in the 1940s by
Raphael Lemkin, a polish attorney and advisor to the US War Ministry.69 Following
the 1939 German invasion of Poland, Lemkin fled and eventually relocated to the
United States. In 1944, Lemkin’s Axis Rule in Occupied Europe was published, which
contained a thorough account of German crimes committed in Europe. This book,
coupled with Lemkin’s tireless advocacy, played a key role in the drafting and pas-
sage of the UNCG.70
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Lemkin’s conception of genocide was broad, encompassing not just killings but
also economic, political, intellectual, and cultural destruction. As outlined in Axis
Rule, the Nazi genocide occurred
through a synchronized attack on different aspects of life of the captive peoples: in the
political field (by destroying institutions of self-government and imposing a German
pattern of administration, and through colonization by Germans); in the social field
(by disrupting the social cohesion of the nation involved and killing or removing ele-
ments such as the intelligentsia . . .); in the cultural field (by promoting or destroying
cultural institutions and cultural activities; by substituting vocational education for
education in the liberal arts, in order to prevent humanistic thinking); in the eco-
nomic field (by shifting wealth to Germans and by prohibiting the exercise of trades
and occupations by people who do not promote Germanism ‘‘without reservations’’);
in the biological field (by a policy of depopulation and by promoting procreation by
Germans in the occupied countries); and in the field of physical existence (by introduc-
ing a starvation rationing system for non-Germans and by mass killings, mainly of
Jews, Poles, Slovenes and Russians); in the religious field (by interfering with the
activities of the Church, which in many countries provides not just spiritual but also
national leadership); in the field of morality (by attempts to create an atmosphere of
moral debasement through promoting pornographic publications and motion pictures,
and the excessive consumption of alcohol).71
According to the sociologist Martin Shaw, ‘‘This full explanation [of genocide] is im-
portant. It shows that genocide, for the term’s inventor, was a comprehensive process
in which a power ‘attacked’ and ‘destroyed’ the way of life and institutions of
peoples.’’72 Notwithstanding, such a broad-based definition, including a category of
‘‘cultural genocide,’’ was rejected in the final UNCG draft.73 Shaw argues that,
subsequently, the meaning of genocide has lost the broad sociological understand-
ing articulated by Lemkins.74 This tendency is exemplified by the ‘‘conceptual pro-
liferation’’ of terms connoting only some functional aspect of genocide’s original
notion.75
Perhaps the most well known ‘‘conceptual proliferation’’ is the phrase ‘‘ethnic
cleansing.’’ This term entered common parlance during the wars in Bosnia and
Croatia. Providing an early description, Andrew Bell-Fialkoff wrote in 1993 that
this usage
defies easy definition. At one end it is virtually indistinguishable from forced emigra-
tion and population exchange while at the other it merges with deportation and geno-
cide. At the most general level, however, ethnic cleansing can be understood as
the expulsion of an ‘‘undesirable’’ population from a given territory due to religious
or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combi-
nation of these.76
In contrast, genocide has been described as ‘‘a form of one-sided mass killing in
which a state or authority intends to destroy a group.’’77 In other words, the term
genocide is meant to convey ‘‘mass killing,’’ whereas ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ signifies the
forced removal from a particular territory. The Rome Statute of the ICC recognizes
the ‘‘deportation or forcible transfer of population’’ as a crime against humanity.78
The word ‘‘genocide’’ carries compelling political and legal implications; perhaps
contributing to a reluctance of the world community to invoke it. Critics argue that
substituting the term ‘‘genocide’’ with ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ communicates a lower level
of alarm and responsibility to act.79 The term itself is suspect:
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Genocide has been the leading cause of preventable violent death in the 20th–21st
century, taking even more lives than war. The term ethnic cleansing is used as a
euphemism for genocide despite it having no legal status. Like Judenrein in Nazi
Medicine, it expropriates pseudo-medical terminology to justify massacre. Use of
the term dehumanizes the victims as a source of filth and disease, propagates the
reversed social ethics of the perpetrators.80
Shaw agrees: ‘‘‘Ethnic cleansing’ comes without genocide’s definite legal prohibition,
but it also offers less of a theoretical challenge: it is a minimal, euphemistic term,
often adopted for reasons of intellectual as well as political avoidance.’’81
During the early 1990s, the term ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ was frequently used inter-
changeably with genocide. The World Conference on Human Rights adopted a resolu-
tion in 1993 on Bosnia, which stated that ‘‘the practice of ethnic cleansing resulting
from Serbian aggression against the Muslim and Croat population in the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes genocide in violation of the Convention . . .’’82
The Commission of Experts appointed by the Security Council suggested that ‘‘ethnic
cleansing’’ could violate the UNCG:
Based on the many reports describing the policy and practices conducted in the former
Yugoslavia, ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ has been carried out by means of murder, torture, arbi-
trary arrest and detention, extrajudicial executions, rape and sexual assault, con-
finement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and
deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on
civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property. Those practices con-
stitute crimes against humanity and can be assimilated to specific war crimes. Fur-
thermore, such acts could also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention.83
Similarly, a UN General Assembly resolution passed on 18 December 1992 denounced
the ‘‘abhorrent policy of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ which is a form of genocide.’’84 When it
was equating ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ with genocide, the UN was clearly referring to
intensified aggressive acts by the Serbian and Montenegrin forces to acquire more ter-
ritories by force, characterized by a consistent pattern of gross and systemic violations
of human rights, a burgeoning refugee population resulting from mass expulsions of
defenseless civilians from their homes and the existence in Serbian and Montenegrin
controlled areas of concentration camps and detention centres . . .85
This view is by no means universal. The eminent genocide scholar William Schabas
opines that ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ is not genocide because the intent is to remove a
population, not physically destroy it.86 He further concludes that ‘‘the drafters of
the Convention quite deliberately resisted attempts to encompass the phenomenon
of ethnic cleansing within the punishable acts.’’87 Interestingly, Schabas notes
that Syria proposed an amendment incorporating a definition of genocide similar
to the contemporary notion of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’: ‘‘Imposing measures intended to
oblige members of a group to abandon their homes in order to escape the threat of
subsequent ill-treatment.’’88 Yugoslavia supported the amendment, citing the Nazis’
removal of Slav populations from parts of Yugoslavia: ‘‘That action was tantamount
to the deliberate destruction of a group . . . Genocide could be committed by forcing
members of a group to abandon their homes . . .’’89
The Syrian amendment was defeated, incurring opposition from the United
States. The US delegate argued that the Syrian concept ‘‘deviated too much from
the original concept of genocide.’’90 In Prosecutor v. Stakic, the rejection of the Syrian
proposal was cited by the ICTY Trial Chamber as evidence that ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’
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was deliberately excluded from the UNCG,91 although comments accompanying the
Secretariat draft of the convention acknowledge that ‘‘[m]ass deportation of popula-
tions from one region to another also does not constitute genocide. It would, however,
become genocide if the occupation were also attended by such circumstances as to
lead to the death of the whole or part of the displaced population . . .’’92 As Schabas
pointedly cautions: ‘‘Ethnic cleansing is also a warning of genocide to come . . . Geno-
cide is the last resort of the frustrated ethnic cleanser.’’93
Although he holds that genocide and ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ are two different activi-
ties, the historian Norman Naimark concedes:
Further complicating the distinctions between ethnic cleansing and genocide is the
fact that forced deportation seldom takes place without violence, often murderous vio-
lence. People do not leave their homes on their own . . . They resist . . . The result is
that forced deportation often becomes genocidal, as people are violently ripped from
their native towns and villages and killed when they try to stay. Even when forced
deportation is not genocidal in its intent, it is often genocidal in its effect.94
This raises the following questions: Can true ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ really be achieved
without resorting to mass violence and murder? Doesn’t ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’ by its
very nature, at least imply some component of genocide; such as the mens rea ‘‘intent
to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group . . .’’ ? Is
there really a meaningful distinction between intent to ‘‘destroy’’ versus the intent
to ‘‘cleanse’’ a territory of a particular group? As Shaw concludes: ‘‘It is not just that
‘cleansing’ is sometimes genocidal, or that genocide is ‘extreme’ cleansing. Cleansing
language invariably oozes genocidal intent, resonating with the idea of destroying, if
not murdering, the groups to whom it is applied.’’95
Shaw suggests that ‘‘expulsion of populations’’ is a central feature of genocide.96
He offers a definition of genocidal conduct as ‘‘action in which armed power organiza-
tions treat civilian social groups as enemies and aim to destroy their real or putative
social power, by means of killing, violence and coercion against individuals whom
they regard as members of the groups.’’97 Shaw’s emphasis isn’t narrowly focused
on the murder of individual members but on destroying a group’s economic, political,
and cultural power. ‘‘Destroying’’ is understood as inevitably violent, incorporat-
ing several power modalities, that is, killing, violence, and coercion.98 Accordingly,
Shaw’s illustration is reminiscent of Lemkin’s broader generic concept of genocide.
Of course, adopting too broad a definition of genocide creates the risk of trivializ-
ing the term. But ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ can hardly be considered trivial, especially when
accompanied by violence and murder. As Schabas admits, ‘‘[B]oth genocide and
ethnic cleansing may share the same goal, which is to eliminate the persecuted
group from a given area . . .’’99 Notwithstanding debate over if and when ‘‘ethnic
cleansing’’ is genocide, both terms contain similar characteristics that need to be
more thoroughly identified and established in the adjudication of genocide.
Adjudicating Genocide
For genocide to be proved, it must be demonstrated that the perpetrator had
the ‘‘intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group. . .’’100 The specific intent to destroy a protected group has been characterized
as the distinguishing feature of genocide: ‘‘Thus, for an individual to be guilty of
committing genocide, he or she must have an aggravated criminal intent in addition
to having the criminal intent accompanying the underlying offense such as killing or
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the protected group.’’101 In
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Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the ICTY Trial Chamber explained that ‘‘genocide is distinct
from other crimes inasmuch as it embodies a special intent or dolus specialis. Special
intent of a crime is the specific intention, required as a constitutive element of
the crime, which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act
charged.’’102 The Trial Chamber further stressed in Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic
that it is ‘‘not sufficient that the perpetrator simply knew that the underlying crime
would inevitably or likely result in destruction of the group. The destruction, in
whole or in part, must be the aim of the underlying crime(s).’’103
Dermot Groome, an ICTY senior prosecutor, contends that this mens rea require-
ment makes proving genocidal intent particularly difficult: ‘‘In many cases the actus
reus of genocide may be virtually indistinguishable from the actus reus of other
serious international crimes, such as some forms of persecution as a crime against
humanity . . . Of special note in this context is the determination whether a discrimi-
natory crime was perpetrated against victims because of their membership in a
group or was also intended as part of an effort to destroy the group itself.’’104
This dilemma is further compounded by the collective nature of the crime,
involving numerous individuals each with potentially differing motivations and
intentions. ‘‘It may be that the direct perpetrators harbor genocidal intent, whereas
state officials do not. Conversely, the state’s senior leaders may be the architects of
a carefully calculated genocidal plan that employs a multitude of others as instru-
mentalities who themselves do not possess genocidal intent,’’ adds Groome.105
Accordingly, to determine state culpability, the ICJ had to examine the conduct and
motives of individual Serbian actors, and distinguish between genocide and other
grievous violations, such as crimes against humanity. In other words, the ICJ had
to make similar determinations that were congruently being made by the ICTY, but
without the ICTY’s rules of procedure and evidence purposefully designed for such
inquiry.
Similar to domestic criminal courts, the ICTY is uniquely structured to probe
alleged criminal actions and intents of individuals. For example, one prominent fea-
ture of the ICTY Statute is the creation of an independent prosecutor’s office to fully
investigate claims made by all parties.106 In contrast, the ICJ has no independent
fact finding entity and has to depend primarily upon party submissions. While the
ICJ does have some authority to independently request production of evidence,107
without the enforcement mechanisms of domestic courts, these provisions are rarely
used. This deficiency proved especially daunting when evaluating individual acts of
alleged genocide. For instance, the ICJ relied on witness testimony conducted during
ICTY proceedings without the benefit of being able to pose questions directly at the
deponent.108 In short, although designed as a civil forum, the ICJ had to assess the
alleged criminal conduct of multiple individuals and entities.
Consequently, this necessitated a dependence on the findings of individual crim-
inal responsibility issued from the ICTY. The ICJ acknowledged this ‘‘unusual fea-
ture’’ whereby ‘‘[M]any of the allegations before it have already been the subject of
the processes and decisions of the ICTY.’’109 The Court accepted the ‘‘fact-finding
process of the ICTY’’ as ‘‘ ‘evidence obtained by examination of persons directly
involved,’ tested by cross-examination, the credibility of which has not been chal-
lenged subsequently.’’110 Indeed, Groome warns that having two international
courts, with one resolving allegations of State culpability and the other ‘‘designed
for adjudication of individual crimes,’’ creates separate judicial forums evaluating
similar claims with potentially inconsistent results.111 This could prove problematic
within an international legal system that is horizontally structured. The upshot is
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that the ICJ adopted nearly all factual and legal conclusions of the ICTY, even while
applying different legal standards on particular findings.
The second issue is the standard of proof espoused by the Court. Rejecting
Bosnia’s request that acts of alleged genocide should be proven on the ‘‘balance of
the probabilities,’’ the Court pronounced that ‘‘claims against a State involving
charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully conclusive.’’112
The ICJ has been critiqued for applying a standard of proof akin to those used in
criminal proceedings to a suit that was civil in nature. The Court does not have
criminal jurisdiction. Indeed, the ICJ’s own opinion concedes that ‘‘international law
does not recognize the criminal responsibility of the State, and the Genocide Conven-
tion does not provide a vehicle for the imposition of such criminal responsibility.’’113
Although, to assess claims of genocide, the Court did have to make findings that
were criminal in nature. Further, the provisions of the UNCG are predominantly
criminal, as opposed to the Geneva Conventions that are ‘‘mixed.’’ However, while
adopting a standard of proof equivalent to that of a criminal trial under these circum-
stances is arguably defensible, it raises a new set of difficulties. As Groome posits,
‘‘Given a standard of proof equivalent to that of a criminal trial for an inquiry that
obliges the ICJ to examine the states of minds of individuals not before it, one
wonders how an applicant could ever meet that burden.’’114 Stated differently, the
ICJ had to ascertain the criminal intent of individuals over whom the Court had no
jurisdiction while adhering to a high standard of proof.
Even more disconcerting, however, was that the ICJ did not evaluate all avail-
able evidence at its disposal. One oft-cited example was the Court’s refusal to
consider ‘‘redacted’’ sections of documents from the Supreme Defense Council of
Serbia. During the ICTY trial of Slobodan Milosevic, hundreds of documents were
produced marked ‘‘Defense. State Secret. Strictly Confidential.’’115 Described as
‘‘incriminating,’’ these documents contained meeting minutes of Yugoslavia’s political
and military leaders promising ‘‘the best inside view of Serbia’s role in the Bosnian
war . . .’’116 However, citing national security concerns, Serbia obtained permission to
keep parts of these documents confidential.117
The New York Times reported that attorneys who reviewed these documents
attested that they demonstrated how Belgrade financed the war.118 They reportedly
contained evidence that the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS), though officially separate
after 1992, remained a de facto extension of the Yugoslav Army, and that ‘‘the
archives showed in verbatim records and summaries of meetings that Serbian forces,
including secret police, played a role in the takeover of Srebrenica and in prepara-
tion of the massacre there.’’119 Notwithstanding, the ICJ declined to investigate
these documents, reasoning that Bosnia already had ‘‘extensive documentation and
other evidence available to it . . .’’120 This failure to examine what might have been
the most available dispositive evidence of state culpability raises doubts about the
Court’s conclusion that Serbia did not commit genocide.
Concerns also stem from the criteria used in evaluating the admissible evidence
of state complicity. Bosnia alleges that Serbia supplied the VRS with aid and assis-
tance at a time when Serbian authorities were ‘‘clearly aware that genocide was
about to take place or was underway.’’121 In order to hold Serbia liable for the
actions of certain non-de jure organs, including the VRS and several paramilitary en-
tities, some form of state control had to be demonstrated. The ICJ used the ‘‘effective
control test’’ instead of the ‘‘overall control test’’ proposed by Bosnia and exercised by
the ICTY. ‘‘Effective control’’ requires either that there be ‘‘complete dependence’’ on
the controlling authority or that specific ‘‘instructions’’ be given for each operation
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in which violations occur, as opposed to ‘‘generally in respect of the overall actions
taken by the persons or groups of persons having committed the violations.’’122 The
ICJ’s justification for this higher standard, enunciated in Nicaragua v. United States
of America,123 was that ‘‘this is the state of customary international law’’ as reflected
in article 8 of the International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility.124
However, as Brunell University law professor Ademola Abass points out, custom-
ary international law does not ‘‘cast the particular form of that control in stone . . .
The jurisprudence of other international tribunals treats the required control with
some degree of flexibility.’’125 For example, the ICTY has found that ‘‘the ‘overall
control’ test could thus be fulfilled even if the armed forces acting on behalf of the
‘controlling state’ had autonomous choices and tactics although participating in a
common strategy along with the controlling State.’’126
In Tadic, the ICTY Appeals Chamber endorsed the ‘‘overall control’’ test by
explaining,
The requirement of international law for the attribution to States of acts performed
by private individuals is that the State exercise control over the individual. The
degree of control may, however, vary according to the factual circumstances of each
case. The Appeals Chamber fails to see why in each and every circumstance interna-
tional law should require a high threshold for the test of control.127
While allowing that ‘‘overall control’’ may be the appropriate standard when examin-
ing international humanitarian law, the Court’s application of the more demanding
‘‘effective control’’ test used to apply a state’s responsibility colors the perception of
how conclusions were drawn regarding Serbia’s role.
For instance, evidence documented from previous tribunal cases illustrate that in
late 1993, over 1,800 officers and noncommissioned Yugoslav Army men were also
serving in the Bosnian Serb Army while being deployed, paid, or promoted by
Belgrade. Top military brass were given dual identities and Belgrade created the
30th Personnel Center described as ‘‘a secret office for dealing with officers listed in
both armies.’’128 The Court even acknowledges that Serbia was ‘‘making its consi-
derable military and financial support available to the Republika Srpska, and had it
withdrawn that support, this would have greatly constrained the options that were
available . . .’’129 Notwithstanding, the ICJ was only willing to find state liability if
Belgrade gave direct ‘‘instructions’’ for specific actions or whenever Bosnian Serbs
were ‘‘completely dependent’’ upon Belgrade.130
As Ruth Wedgwood, an international law professor at Johns Hopkins University,
exclaims, ‘‘This will be a surprise to scholars of ordinary tort law, who are accus-
tomed to supposing that responsibility can be shared.’’131 Wedgwood also notes that
this requirement conflicts with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373,
passed in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, confirming that no
state can provide intelligence, logistics, or financing to terrorist activities.132 In a dis-
senting opinion, ICJ vice-president Al-Khasawneh concludes: ‘‘The inherent danger
in such an approach is that it gives States the opportunity to carry out criminal
policies through non-state actors or surrogates without incurring direct responsibility
therefore.’’133
Further, the Court’s finding that Serbia did not ‘‘control’’ the relevant forces yet
failed to prevent the Srebrenica genocide seems incongruent (implying that Serbia
could have prevented the genocide despite not having sufficient control over perti-
nent actors). With a crime as vast and complex as genocide, it is unlikely that any
one participant is going to have ‘‘effective control’’ over certain events. The crime of
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genocide is compounded, requiring coordination and support from multiple sources.
Accordingly, article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute recognizes the perpetration of a crime
through four possible methods of control: direct perpetration; perpetration through
another person or indirect perpetration; co-perpetration based on joint control; or
indirect co-perpetration.134
Indirect control is ‘‘applicable when some or all the co-perpetrators carry out
their respective essential contributions to the common plan through another per-
son.’’135 During the confirmation of charges in the Lubanga and Katanga and
Ngudjolo cases, the ICC described complicity based on joint control:
The concept of co-perpetration based on joint control over the crime is rooted in the
principle of division of essential tasks for the purpose of committing a crime between
two or more persons acting in a concerted manner. Hence, although none of the par-
ticipants has overall control over the offence because they all depend on one another
for its commission, they all share control because each of them could frustrate the
commission of the crime by not carrying out his or her task.136
The more flexible ‘‘control’’ standards enumerated by both the ICC and the ICTY
are in contrast to the ICJ’s rigid requirement of direct ‘‘instructions’’ or complete
dependence on the controlling authority. Accordingly, the ICJ needs to recognize
that ‘‘control’’ can be exercised within varying levels, degrees, and methods.
‘‘Ethnic Cleansing’’ and Systemic Patterns of Abuse
Another shortcoming was the ICJ’s approach in appraising evidence of a ‘‘genocidal
pattern.’’ Bosnia sought to demonstrate a consistent pattern of genocidal conduct
adduced over a period of years. To do so, the intentions and actions of Serbian
political and military leaders had to be assessed. The Court considered a document
derived under the auspices of the Bosnian Serb Assembly entitled Decision on the
Strategic Goals of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia contended
that this document indicated that both Radovan Karadzic (president of Republika
Srpska from 1992 to 1996) and Milosevic supported the goal of separating Serbia
from the ‘‘other two ethnic communities.’’137
The ICJ’s reason for rejecting this argument is twofold: first, the Court main-
tained that ethnic cleansing alone does not constitute genocide and Bosnia’s applica-
tion failed to ‘‘come to terms with the fact that an essential motive of much of the
Bosnian Serb leadership—to create a larger Serb State, by a war of conquest if
necessary—did not necessarily require the destruction of the Bosnian Muslims and
other communities, but their expulsion.’’138 The ICJ cited with approval the ICTY
Trial Chamber’s holding that ‘‘a clear distinction must be drawn between physical
destruction and mere dissolution of a group. The expulsion of a group or part of
a group does not in itself suffice for genocide.’’139 While proposing a theoretical
hypothesis, this explanation fails to explain what actually did transpire. As Abass
inquired: ‘‘If the simple goal of Serbia was to simply establish a State of Serbia,
as the Court claimed, how then does one account for all the killings that took
place?’’140
In a separate opinion to the second 1993 provisional order, ad hoc Judge Elihu
Lauterpacht reasonably asked, ‘‘Has genocide been committed?’’ He noted that
. . . the forced migration of civilians, more commonly known as ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’ is,
in truth, part of a deliberate campaign by the Serbs to eliminate Muslim control of,
and presence in, substantial parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina . . . it is difficult to regard
the Serbian acts as other than acts of genocide . . . they are clearly directed against
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an ethnical or religious group as such, and they are intended to destroy that group,
if not in whole certainly in part, to the extent necessary to ensure that the group no
longer occupied the parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina coveted by the Serbs.141
However, this view was not embraced by the majority of the Court.
Citing a report from the UN Commission of Experts, which concluded that the
blockage of humanitarian aid was used to assist the takeover of Sarajevo, the ICJ
found that ‘‘civilian members of the protected group were deliberately targeted by
Serb forces in Sarajevo and other cities . . . UNHCR food and fuel convoys had been
‘obstructed or attacked by Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces and sometimes
also by governmental forces’ ’’142 Moreover, the ICJ highlighted other instances, for
example,
. . . with regard to Gorazde, the Special Rapporteur found that the enclave was being
shelled and had been denied convoys of humanitarian aid for two months. Although
food was being air-dropped, it was insufficient . . . In a later report, the Special
Rapporteur noted that, as of Spring 1994, the town had been subject to a military
offensive by Bosnian Serb forces, during which civilian objects including the hospital
had been targeted and the water supply had been cut off . . . Humanitarian convoys
were harassed including by detention of UNPROFOR personnel and the theft of
equipment . . . Similar patterns occurred in Bihac, Tuzla, Cerska, and Maglaj.143
Despite such evidence, the ICJ concluded that the perpetrators did not act with the
specific intent to destroy the protected group. The Court placed particular emphasis
on the fact that ‘‘[t]he Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights was of the view that the siege, including the shelling of population
centres and the cutting off of supplies of food and other essential goods, is another
tactic used to force Muslims and ethnic Croatians to flee.’’144 In other words, accord-
ing to the ICJ, forcing a particular group to flee did not reflect the intent to destroy.
The Court’s reasoning was recently cited by the ICC when the Pre-Trial Chamber
found insufficient evidence to prosecute al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, for geno-
cide in connection with Darfur.145
Second, the ICJ noted that the ICTY made a similar ruling on the same claim,
stating that Bosnia’s contention ‘‘is not consistent with the findings of the ICTY re-
lating to genocide or with the actions of the Prosecutor, including decisions not to
charge genocide offences in possibly relevant indictments, and to enter into plea
agreements . . .’’146 The problem with this rationale, however, is that the ICTY was
not just settling claims of genocide, it was also resolving allegations of crimes against
humanity and war crimes. A prosecutor may exercise discretion, based on various
factors, to plea bargain and/or not charge a particular crime. In other words, unlike
the ICJ, the ICTY had the option of convicting not just for genocide but also for over-
lapping violations. Prosecutors have a predilection for charges that will stick, and it
is likely easier to obtain a conviction for war crimes or crimes against humanity than
for genocide.
Notwithstanding, during the Rule 61 hearing147 in Karadzic and Mladic, the
ICTY prosecutor offered a description of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ that sounds eerily similar
to genocide:
Well, ethnic cleansing is a practice which means that you act in such a way that in a
given territory the members of a given ethnic group are eliminated. It means a prac-
tice that aims at such and such a territory be, as they meant, ethnically pure. So, in
other words, the members of the other group are eliminated by different ways, by dif-
ferent methods. You have massacres. Everybody is not massacred, but I mean in
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terms of numbers, you have massacres in order to scare these populations. Sometimes
these massacres are selective, but they aim at eliminating the elite of a given popula-
tion, but they are massacres. I mean, that is the point. So whenever you have mas-
sacres, naturally the other people are driven away. They are afraid. They try to run
away and you find yourself with a high number of a given people that have been
massacred, persecuted and, of course, in the end these people simply want to leave.
They are also submitted to such pressures that they go away. They are driven away
either on their own initiative or they are deported. But the basic point is for them to
be out of that territory and some of them are sometimes locked up in camps. Some
women are raped and, furthermore, often times what you have is destruction of the
monuments which marked the presence of a given population in a given territory, for
instance, religious places, Catholic churches or mosques are destroyed. So basically,
this is how ethnic cleansing is practiced in the course of this war.148
The prosecutor’s summary of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ brings to mind Lemkin’s broad-
based concept of synchronized attacks ‘‘on different aspects of the life of the captive
peoples . . .’’149
While the prosecutor was hesitant to pursue charges of genocide, the ICTY recog-
nized that ‘‘cleansing’’ could amount to genocide in certain cases:
The policy of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ . . . presents, in its ultimate manifestation, genocidal
characteristics. Furthermore, in this case, the intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, which is specific to genocide, may be
inferred from the gravity of the ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ practiced in Srebrenica and its sur-
rounding areas, i.e., principally the mass killings of Muslims which occurred after the
fall of Srebrenica in July 1995, which were committed in circumstances manifesting
an almost unparalleled cruelty.150
The Brdanin Trial Chamber also acknowledged that ‘‘ethnic cleansing may under
certain circumstances ultimately reach the level of genocide . . .’’151 However, the
ICJ refused to find that ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ reached the level of genocide in instances
other than in Srebrenica.
Similarly, criticism has been directed at the Court’s apparent neglect to properly
weigh genocidal proofs in a cumulative manner. Judge Al-Khasawneh had observed
that ‘‘genocide is definitionally a complex crime in the sense that unlike homicide it
takes time to achieve, requires repetitiveness, and is committed by many persons
and organs acting in concert. As such, it cannot be appreciated in a disconnected
manner. Unfortunately, there are instances in the (Court’s) judgment where this
happens . . .’’152 In determining genocidal intent, the ICJ should have more collec-
tively considered its own findings of ethnic cleansing coupled with ‘‘evidence of kill-
ings of members of the protected group in principal areas of Bosnia [Sarajevo, Drina
River Valley, Prijedor, Banja Luka and Brcko] and in various detention camps.’’153
In addition to Srebrenica, the Court acknowledged ‘‘fully conclusive evidence that
members of the protected group were systematically victims of massive mistreat-
ment, beatings, rape and torture causing serious bodily and mental harm, during
the conflict and, in particular, in the detention camps.’’154 This includes the 1992
killing of civilians in Brcko and the torture and execution of Muslims in Foca.155
The Court appears to treat these as separate, isolated episodes rather than as
systemic patterns of abuse. While granting that these acts may constitute war
crimes and crimes against humanity, the ICJ failed to identify any specific intent to
‘‘destroy, in whole or in part, the (protected) group as such.’’156 This narrow reading
of the evidence conflicts with ICTY jurisprudence that suggests that proof of geno-
cidal intent ‘‘may, in the absence of direct explicit evidence, be inferred from a
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number of facts and circumstances, such as the general context, the scale of atroci-
ties committed, the systematically targeting of victims on account of their member-
ship of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory
acts.’’157 Accordingly, a more holistic analysis might conclude that acts of genocide
occurred in areas outside Srebrenica.
In the end, despite finding ‘‘overwhelming evidence that massive killings in spe-
cific areas and detention camps throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina
were perpetrated during the conflict’’158 and that ‘‘evidence presented shows that the
victims were in large majority members of the protected group, which suggests that
they may have been systematically targeted by the killings,’’159 the only cognizable
claim of genocide recognized by the Court was the Srebrenica slaughter. Further,
this verdict was limited by the finding that Serbia only failed to prevent genocide,
as opposed to it being an accomplice. Furthermore, the ICJ opinion failed to ade-
quately expound upon why the Srebrenica carnage amounted to genocide while other
documented instances of inhumanity and mass murder did not. Unfortunately, these
defects overshadow an otherwise substantial holding that a nation-state can be held
liable under the UNCG and that a state has a duty to prevent genocide.
‘‘Ethnic Cleansing’’ Revisited
Croatia’s allegations against Serbia were remarkably similar to those of Bosnia.
Docketed in 1999, Croatia is suing Serbia for ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ described as ‘‘a
form of genocide . . .’’160 Croatia alleged that Belgrade supported a Croatian Serb
insurgency following Croatia’s declaration of independence from Yugoslavia in 1991,
resulting in killings and displacement of Croatians from the Krajina (an area cover-
ing roughly a third of Croatia).161 Specifically, Croatia charges stated:
By directly controlling the activity of its armed forces, intelligence agents and various
paramilitary detachments, on territory of the Republic of Croatia, in the Knin region,
eastern and western Slavonia, and Dalmatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is
liable for the ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ of Croatian citizens from these areas—a form of geno-
cide which resulted in large numbers of Croatian citizens being displaced, killed, tor-
tured or illegally detained, as well as extensive property destruction—and is required
to provide reparation for the resulting damages. In addition, by directing, encourag-
ing, and urging Croatian citizens of Serb ethnicity in the Knin region to evacuate the
area in 1995, as the Republic of Croatia reasserted its legitimate governmental au-
thority (and in the face of clear reassurance emanating from the highest level of the
Croatian government, including the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo
Tudjman, that the local Serbs had nothing to fear and should stay), the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia engaged in conduct amounting to a second round of ‘‘ethnic
cleansing’’ in violation of the Genocide Convention.162
As a result of Yugoslavia aggression, Croatia alleged,
In Croatia, there were 20,000 dead and 55,000 wounded . . . In 1992, the humani-
tarian crisis in Croatia was at its peak, with approximately 800,000 displaced persons
and refugees . . . Several thousand Croat civilians were taken prisoner and forcibly
transferred to Serbia and other areas . . . Of the 7,000 people later released, 60 per-
cent had spent time in prisons or detention facilities . . . 1,821 cultural monuments
were destroyed or damaged . . . 171,000 housing units . . . were destroyed . . . about 25
per cent of Croatia’s total economic capacity . . . was damaged or destroyed during
1991–1992 . . .163
Serbia initially threatened to countersue, primarily in connection with the Croatian
offensive Operation Storm, launched in August 1995 to recapture the Krajina. Ac-
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cording to Serbia, this resulted in over 200,000 refugees and the murder of civilians
left behind.164 The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia estimated that
there were 680 civilian victims. Veritas, a Serbian documentation center, put the
figure at nearly 1,200.165 According to the ICTY, 350 elderly or ill people were killed
by Croat forces.166 In February 2004, former Croatian generals Ivan Cermak and
Mladen Markac were indicted for crimes against humanity and violations of the
laws or customs of war committed in connection with Operation Storm.167 They,
along with former Croatian general Ante Gotovina, are currently being tried at the
ICTY.168 At the time of this writing, Serbia has been given until 22 March 2010 to
file a response to Croatia’s allegations.169
A particularly revealing set of developments were the events that lead to the
ICTY plea agreement reached with Milan Babic, former president of the self-
proclaimed Serb Republic of Krajina (RSK) from 1991 to 1992. The RSK was founded
in response to the Croatian declaration of independence. Babic believed that the
Serbs in Krajina would become a minority and advocated for the creation of an inde-
pendent Serbian state.170 According to Babic’s indictment, between August 1991
through at least June 1992:
Serb forces, comprised of JNA [Yugoslav People’s Army], Local Serb TO units from
Serbia and Montenegro, Local and Serbian MUP police units, including ‘‘Martic’s
Police,’’ and paramilitary units, attacked and took control of towns, villages and
settlements in the SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] Krajina/RSK. After the take-
over, Serb forces, in co-operation with the local Serb authorities, established a regime
of persecutions designed to drive the Croat and other non-Serb civilian populations
from these territories . . . According to the 1991 census the total population of the
SAO Krajina/RSK was 286,716. Croats amounted to 78,611 (27, 42%) of the total
population. Only 1,932 (0, 67%) Muslims were registered at that time. Virtually the
whole Croat, Muslim and non-Serb population of the SOA Krajina/RSK was forcibly
removed, deported or killed.171
Babic and Slobodan Milosevic were originally allies, but had a falling out over a dis-
agreement of the 1992 cease-fire between Croatia and the insurgency. As a result,
Babic was ‘‘unceremoniously removed from office at the beginning of 1992 by Serbia’s
President.’’172 In September 2001, Babic was named as a co-perpetrator in the initial
ICTY indictment issued against Milosevic.173 The following year, Babic voluntarily
testified during Milosevic’s trial that the former Serbian president exercised political,
financial, and military influence over the Serb minority in Croatia.174 Whether out of
vengeance or remorse, Babic was willing to provide self-incriminating testimony that
was ‘‘of major significance to the Prosecution’s case and substantially reduced its
need for further in-depth investigations and presentation of evidence.’’175
According to Babic, the Krajina area was underdeveloped and the RSK could not
have been sustained without Serbia’s financial support.176 This testimony was corro-
borated by former US ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, who asserted that
Krajina was ‘‘a completely impoverished region that could not exist even at the very
low level that it existed without financial support from Serbia.’’177 Babic further
explained,
most of the commanding cadre, commanding staff [in the Croatian Serb Army] were
active officers of the JNA who were on the JNA payroll. They were paid by the
General Staff of the Yugoslav Army and appointed to those positions by the personnel
department of the General Staff of the Yugoslav People’s Army. The commanders of
the army were appointed by . . . Slobodan Milosevic-and it was financed, logistics sup-
port was given by Yugoslavia.178
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Babic’s indictment, issued in November 2003, contained charges of murder, forced
deportation, prolonged and routine imprisonment, and destruction of localities,
homes, and cultural institutions.179 Pursuant to an agreed upon plea, Babic con-
fessed to acting as a co-perpetrator. The prosecutor recommended a sentence of no
more than eleven years, taking into consideration Babic’s cooperation in testifying
against Milosevic.180 Babic was subsequently sentenced to thirteen years, which
was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber.181 On 5 March 2006 (six days before
Milosevic’s death), Babic reportedly committed suicide in a prison cell.
Milosevic was ultimately charged on three separate ICTY indictments related
to Kosovo,182 Bosnia and Herzegovina,183 and Croatia.184 The Croatia indictment
contained thirty-two counts, including criminal responsibility for crimes against
humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws
and customs of war. (Unlike the Bosnian indictment,185 the Croatian indictment did
not contain specific charges of genocide.)186 These acts consisted of a ‘‘joint criminal
enterprise’’ calculated to bring about the ‘‘forcible removal of the Croat and other
non-Serb population . . .’’187 The reference to a ‘‘joint criminal enterprise’’ indicates
that the crimes alleged weren’t perpetrated by Milosevic alone but in concert with
other entities and individuals.
Methods included murder, prolonged imprisonment, creating inhumane living
conditions for Croat and other non-Serb civilians in detention centers, torture, the
destruction of homes and cultural institutions, and the deportation of ‘‘at least
170,000 Croat and other non-Serb civilians . . .’’188 Although Milosevic died prior to
the trial reaching a conclusion, the evidence against the defendant, buttressed by
Babic’s testimony, will likely be offered to support Croatia’s claims against Serbia.
Certainly, as president of Serbia during the period in question, Milosevic’s actions
and motives were relevant to Croatia’s allegations.
Notably, pursuant to a Rule 98 hearing, the ICTY found there was sufficient evi-
dence substantiating most counts challenged in the Croatian indictment so that the
Trial Chamber could convict Milosevic.189 These included charges of persecution,
extermination, murder, and killing.190 Similar to a summary judgement motion in
domestic civil proceedings, a Rule 98bis requires the Court to determine if there is
adequate evidence upon which the Trial Chamber could enter a conviction. While
the ICJ has held that it doesn’t give weight to Rule 98 decisions since they don’t con-
stitute a final judgement,191 the Court should be willing to independently examine
the evidence relied upon by the ICTY.
Consequently, the ICTY also found sufficient evidence to convict Milosevic of geno-
cide in relation to Bosnia’s claims.192 According to the Trial Chamber, the proofs
indicated that the ‘‘[a]ccused was the dominant political figure in Serbia and he had
profound influence over the Bosnia Serb political and military authorities.’’193 This
includes evidence that ‘‘there was a basic level of support from Serbia to the Bosnian
Serbs and in particular to the Bosnian Serb Military. The Bosnian Serb Military
emphasized that the chain of command really ran to Belgrade.’’194 The Court cited
testimony from key fact witnesses such as Babic and Galbraith.195 The later asserted
that Milosevic was ‘‘the architect of a policy of creating Greater Serbia and that little
happened without his knowledge and involvement.’’196 Despite such potentially con-
clusive documentation, the ICJ neglected to independently evaluate evidence gleaned
from the Milosevic trial.197 As Groome concludes:
‘‘Ethnic Cleansing’’ and Genocidal Intent
55
. . . the ICJ should have conducted its own examination of this evidence. Such a review
was all the more compulsory in view of the Milosevic trial chamber’s finding that the
evidence could establish not only that Milosevic, by himself, could be convicted of the
crime of genocide, but that he was a member of a joint criminal enterprise comprised
of other senior members of the FRY government similarly engaged in genocidal
crimes . . .198
On the surface, it’s difficult to fathom the ICJ’s arriving at a substantially different
conclusion (from the holding reached in Bosnia) with the current Croatian litigation
considering the similarities and overlaps between the Croatian and Bosnian claims
(i.e., that Serbia committed genocide). At the risk of appearing inconsistent, the
Court would need to examine previously overlooked evidence in a more connected
fashion and conclude that it rises to the level of genocide. But Milosevic’s actions as
head of state and his relationship with Babic and other Serbian leaders and entities
could be dispositive issues the ICJ will need to resolve in assessing Croatia’s alle-
gations. If and how the Court reviews evidence from the Milosevic trial may well
influence the outcome.
The Intent to ‘‘Destroy’’
Regardless of how the ICJ ultimately rules, the Court should use this opportunity
to illuminate when and if evidence of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ can satisfy the mens rea
intent to ‘‘destroy in whole or in part . . .’’ a protected group. What seems paramount
to the Bosnia holding is the insistence that the horrific acts described, both alleged
and acknowledged, were not accompanied with the specific intent to destroy the pro-
tected group. The ICTY reached similar conclusions, writing that
the dolus specialis has not been proved in relation to ‘‘deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part.’’ The Trial Chamber recalls in this context that deporting a group or part of a
group is insufficient if it is not accompanied by methods seeking the physical destruc-
tion of the group.199
But must the ‘‘intent’’ element be required to correlate directly to the prohibited acts
contained in article 2 of the UNCG, or should intent be interpreted more broadly to
include motivation to destroy the protected group as a social unit?
As noted, the ICTY also did not find genocidal intent despite evidence of ‘‘ethnic
cleansing.’’200 However, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kristic instruc-
tively cited the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, which stated that
the statutory definition of genocide defends a supra-individual object of legal protec-
tion, i.e., the social existence of the group . . . the intent to destroy the group . . .
extends beyond physical and biological extermination . . . The text of the law does not
therefore compel the interpretation that the culprit’s intent must be to exterminate
physically at least a substantial number of the members of the group . . .201
While the Trial Chamber declined to fully endorse this approach, the Court acknowl-
edged that ‘‘where there is physical or biological destruction there are often simulta-
neous attacks on the cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted
group as well, attacks which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent
to physically destroy the group.’’202
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The Appeals Chamber in Krstic allowed that
[t]he fact that the forcible transfer does not constitute in and of itself a genocidal act
does not preclude a Trail Chamber from relying on it as evidence of the intentions of
members of the VRS Main Staff. The genocidal intent may be inferred, among other
facts, from evidence of ‘‘other culpable acts systematically directed against the same
group.’’203
These dicta hint at a coherent method in evaluating genocidal intent: the perpetrator
does not have to intend to commit genocide per se. Intention is satisfied when the
goal is to ‘‘destroy’’ a protected group, broadly understood. While the complete de-
finition of ‘‘genocide’’ may require physical or biological destruction (i.e., killing),
methods aimed at ‘‘destroying’’ a protected group should not be so narrowly con-
strued. There are multiple ways that a protected group can be destroyed as a social
unit (i.e., ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’). If, in the process, a prohibited act under the UNCG is
carried out, then evidence of genocide is demonstrated.
A more expansive approach at analyzing intent was embraced by the European
Court of Human Rights in Jorgic v. Germany.204 The Higher Regional Court at
Dusseldorf convicted Nicolai Jorgic, a Bosnian Serb, of eleven counts of genocide,
which included the murder of thirty people. The Court held that the ‘‘intent to de-
stroy’’ did not ‘‘necessitate an intent to destroy that group in a physical or biological
sense. It was sufficient that the perpetrator aimed at destroying the group in ques-
tion as a social unit.’’205 After the conviction was upheld on appeal, Jorgic pleaded
to the European Court of Human Rights that the exercise of universal jurisdiction
violated article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
In rejecting the defendant’s application, the European Court examined the mean-
ing of the phrase ‘‘intent to destroy’’ as contained in article 220a of Germany’s
Criminal Code dealing with genocide. The Court noted that the wording of article 2
of the UNCG corresponds to article 220a of the Criminal Code, which interprets ‘‘the
Genocide Convention so as to comprise the protection of a group as a social unit.’’206
Accordingly, the Court concluded that
the domestic courts’ interpretation of ‘‘intent to destroy a group’’ as not necessitating
a physical destruction of the group, which has also been adopted by a number of
scholars . . . , is therefore covered by the wording, read in its context, of the crime of
genocide in the Criminal Code and does not appear unreasonable.207
In contrast to the European Court, the ICJ postulated that
the intent that characterizes genocide is ‘‘to destroy, in whole or in part’’ a particular
group, and deportation or displacement of the members of a group, even if effected by
force, is not necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is destruction
an automatic consequence of displacement. This is not to say that acts described as
‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ may never constitute genocide, if they are such as to be charac-
terized as, for example, ‘‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calcu-
lated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,’’ contrary to Article
II, paragraph c, of the Convention, provided such action is carried out with the neces-
sary specific intent (dolus specialis), that is to say with a view to the destruction of
the group, as distinct from its removal from the region.208
The Court’s interpretation is problematic. First, it appears to define ‘‘destruction of
the group’’ as limited to physical destruction. Second, when ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ gives
rise to murder, the resultant killing is not happenstance. The ‘‘intent to destroy’’
(a ‘‘substantial’’ portion of )209 a protected group is only one component of genocide.
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Committing a prohibited act, such as murder, completes the criminal definition.
There are many ways a protected group can be ‘‘destroyed.’’ Interpretation of the
UNCG should not require the intent to carry out ‘‘genocide’’ per se, but rather the
intent to ‘‘destroy’’ the social unit of a protected group. If, in the process, a prohibited
act such as murder is contemporaneously performed, then genocide can be inferred.
As noted, the judicial inquiry raised is whether the required ‘‘intent to destroy’’
should be interpreted to strictly refer to the prohibited acts defined by the UNCG. As
Schabas explains, ‘‘an important problem of interpretation arises as to whether the
destruction that is part of the intent, in the first part of article II, must correspond
to the physical or biological destruction defined in the second part of article II.’’210
Schabas points out that the International Law Commission considered this issue
during the drafting of the Code of Crimes and concluded:
As clearly shown by the preparatory work for the Convention, the destruction in ques-
tion is the material destruction of a group either by physical or biological means, not
the destruction of the national, linguistic, religious, cultural or other identity of a
particular group. The national or religious element and racial or ethnic element are
to be taken into consideration in the definition of the word ‘‘destruction,’’ which must
be taken only in its material sense, its physical or biological sense. It is true that the
1947 draft Convention prepared by the Secretary-General and the 1948 draft pre-
pared by the ad hoc Committee on Genocide contained provisions on ‘‘cultural geno-
cide’’ covering any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language,
religion or cultural of a group, such as prohibiting the use of language of a group in
daily intercourse or in schools or the printing and circulation of publications in the
language of the group or destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums,
schools, historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and
objects of the group. However, the text of the Convention, as prepared by the Sixth
Committee and adopted by the General Assembly, did not include the concept of
‘cultural genocide’ contained in the two drafts and simply listed acts which come
within the category of ‘‘physical’’ or ‘‘biological’’ genocide.211
However, when physical or biological destruction is perpetrated in the context of
‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ or some type of ‘‘cultural genocide,’’ are courts to presume such
destruction to be incidental? Does this interpretation make sense in the face of wide-
spread violence, murder, and abuse? If so, can evidence of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ be used
to actually refute genocide claims? (For example, the ICJ relying on the Special
Rapporteur’s conclusion that cutting off food supplies was motivation enough to
cause Muslims and Croatians to flee.)212 These results certainly do not mirror the
letter and spirit of the UNCG. As Schabas succinctly considers:
A court seeking to adopt the broader and more liberal view [of intent] could, however,
rely on the text itself, the objectives of the Convention, the need for dynamic interpre-
tation of legal instruments that protect human rights, and the principle established in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which authorizes resort to a conven-
tion’s preparatory work only when the ordinary meaning of the provision, taken in
its context and in light of its object and purpose, leaves a provision ‘‘ambiguous or
obscure.’’213
Absent careless negligence, the broader interpretation suggested in Jorgic, is the
only logical application when the ‘‘intent to destroy’’ culminates in genocidal conduct.
Instructively, this is underscored in Blagojevic, where the ICTY Trial Chamber
recognized the ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ objective behind the Srebrenica massacre:
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Immediately before and during these massacres, the remainder of the Bosnian Muslim
population of Srebrenica was forcibly transferred to Bosnian Muslim-held territory.
The forcible transfer of the women, children and elderly is a manifestation of the
specific intent to rid the Srebrenica enclave of its Bosnian Muslim population. The
manner in which the transfer was carried out—through force and coercion, by not
registering those who were transferred, by burning the houses of some of the people,
sending the clear message that they had nothing to return to, and significantly,
through its targeting of literally the entire Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica,
including the elderly and children—clearly indicates that it was a means to eradicate
the Bosnian Muslim population from the territory where they had lived.214
Further, it is unlikely that the architects of the UNCG could have anticipated all the
subsequent conditions which have produced genocidal violence. Provocatively, Shaw
questions whether changes in historical trends affect the very nature and perception
of genocide: ‘‘Is the problem posed differently today compared with the period when
the concept [of genocide] was developed? . . . Are the forms of genocide changing?
Are there significant patterns in these changes at the beginning of our new century?
And has the conceptual proliferation [i.e., the term ‘ethnic cleansing’] represented
attempts, confused perhaps, to register historical transformation?’’215
Shaw’s point is that the nature of genocide is not fixed or static. It is multi-
faceted, comprehensive, and variable. While it is unlikely that international courts
will adopt a broader definition of genocide beyond the parameters of the UNCG,
they need to articulate an understanding of genocidal intent that accounts for chang-
ing circumstances and methods. The ‘‘intent to destroy’’ can manifest in many ways.
‘‘Ethnic cleansing’’ might demonstrate such intent, and when accompanied by a pro-
hibited act such as killing, a finding of genocide should be judicially permitted.
Conclusion
The Bosnian genocide case is arguably the most complex matter the ICJ has ever
presided over. To determine state culpability, the ICJ had to assess individual crimi-
nal actions, a task for which it was ill-suited, ensuring a relationship of dependency
with findings of the ICTY. Difficulties were further exacerbated by questionable
methods over what and how to evaluate evidence. Furthermore, the context of ongo-
ing civil strife presented explicit compliance problems that rendered provisional
edicts ineffective. Since the ICJ is the only Court with jurisdiction over nation-states
(the ICC and ICTY have jurisdiction over individuals), it is likely that state respon-
sibility will continue to be contested in this forum when allegations of genocide arise.
Accordingly, reform measures could bolster the Courts ability to analyze complex
facts and better ascertain evidential findings.
Since the ICJ is a court of both first and last impression, it must make dual
findings of fact and law. The Court would benefit from a separate fact-finding com-
mission to evaluate evidential proofs ‘‘when the facts and their elucidation are para-
mount.’’216 If designed as a hybrid entity, this body can incorporate characteristics
similar to both a domestic trial court and prosecutor’s office, with powers of subpoena
and the ability to evaluate witness/expert testimony. The ICJ can then more appro-
priately concern itself with rendering legal opinions based on the facts presented
by the commission. Susan Sa´Couto, director of the War Crimes Research Office at
American University, suggests that such a commission might be useful in providing
preliminary analysis of the best available evidence.217
Similarly, an alternative proposal is to modify the Court’s rules to provide for a
special master to assist with making factual findings.218 The US Supreme Court has
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a comparable modus operandi in matters of original jurisdiction. This might aid the
Court with analyzing pertinent evidence in a more precise fashion. Such reforms
could assist with identifying systemic patterns of abuse, adduced over a period of
time, suggestive of genocidal intent. In addition, it might result in less dependency
on the corresponding work of other courts.
Meanwhile, the significance of the ICJ’s bold ruling establishing an affirmative
duty for nation-states to prevent genocide, to the extent possible, must not be over-
looked. Historically, genocide is virtually always carried out with implicit knowledge
and/or assistance from state authority.219 Providing a cause of action against these
states could both discourage state complicity with genocidal acts and encourage mea-
sures to pro-actively prevent such acts from developing. This prospect is particularly
noteworthy considering the apparent ineffectiveness of the ICJ’s interim measures.
The duty to prevent is an important legal principle that will continue to evolve in
international law.220
As originally proposed, the term genocide conveyed not just mass killings but
also methods designed to dilute a group’s economic, political, and cultural power.
The meaning of genocide has subsequently been more narrowly construed to denote
only conduct calculated to bring about biological or physical destruction, as defined
by the prohibited acts contained in article 2 of the UNCG. Given the many ways an
unwanted group can be targeted, justice would be better served if courts considered
the broader sociological concept advocated by Lemkin. This could be achieved, not by
expanding the list of specific prohibited acts, but through interpreting the ‘‘intent to
destroy’’ so that it includes measures aimed at disrupting the protected group as a
social unit.
While conceived in the aftermath of the Nazi-driven Holocaust, the UNCG has
been interpreted against the backdrop of changing international conditions and
diverse methods of repression. Techniques and circumstances may vary, but the in-
tent to ‘‘destroy’’ a particular group, broadly understood, remains the distinguishing
feature of both genocide and related humanitarian crimes such as ‘‘ethnic cleansing.’’
The role that this plays in adjudicating claims of genocide needs to be further estab-
lished. In Croatia, the ICJ has another opportunity to elaborate on the nexus
between ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ and genocidal intent. Such a contribution will better
reflect the realities of how genocide can unfold in the twenty-first century.
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